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 Nature ceased to be inscrutable, subject to demonic incursions from another world: 
the very essence of Nature, as freshly conceived by the new scientists, was that its 
sequences were orderly and therefore predictable: even the path of a comet could be 
charted through the sky. It was on the model of this external physical order that men 
began systematically to reorganize their minds and their practical activities: this 
carried further, and into every department, the precepts and practices empirically 
fostered by bourgeois finance. Like Emerson, men felt that the universe itself was 
fulfilled and justified, when ships came and went with the regularity of heavenly 
bodies. 
 
- Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 
 
The Rise of a Confident Hollywood:  
Risk and the Capitalization of Cinema 
 
The Hollywood film business, like any other business enterprise, operates 
according to the logic of capitalization. Capitalization in an instrumental logic that 
is forward-looking in its orientation. Capitalization expresses the present value of 
an expected stream of future earnings. And since the earnings of the Hollywood 
film business depend on cinema and mass culture in general, we can say that the 
current fortunes of the Hollywood film business hinge on the future of cinema and 
mass culture. The major filmed entertainment firms of Hollywood discount 
expected future earnings to present prices according to their perception of the 
social-historical trajectory of pleasure. 
  
Included in the capitalization formula is a risk coefficient (δ). This coefficient 
denotes a degree of confidence capitalists have in their earnings predictions. This 
relationship between expected earnings and risk is visible when we write the 
capitalization equation in a simplified form.1 Capitalization at any given time (Kt) is 
equal to the discounted value of expected future earnings (EE). Expected future 
earnings are discounted by the product of two variables: a rate of return that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  am	  temporarily	  ignoring	  hype	  (H),	  which	  is	  also	  in	  the	  numerator	  of	  the	  capitalization	  equation.	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capitalists feel they can confidently get (rc) and the risk coefficient (δ). Put all of 
these pieces together and you have the following equation: 𝐾! = 𝐸𝐸  𝑟!   ×  δ 
 
Risk is an important variable in the capitalization of cinema. From the perspective 
of investment, the future shape of cinema cannot be so uncertain that capitalists are 
unable to estimate, with even a modicum of confidence, how the earnings of a 
possible film project will rank in the order of cinema. For capitalists to invest, the 
risk coefficient has to be finite, which in turn means that, however uncertain, 
capitalists expect the future of cinema to be bounded. Conversely, confidence in 
the capitalization of cinema can increase if risk perceptions about the volatility of a 
film’s earnings can be decreased. Thus, capitalists are interested in creating a 
cultural environment where films have financial trajectories like comets in the sky. 
If the world of cinema can be made to have ‘stable’ laws of motion, vested interests 
can depend on this machine-like regularity when it translates the art of cinema into 
the quantities of capital.2 
 
This paper investigates the historical development of risk in the Hollywood film 
business. Using opening theatres as a proxy for future expectations, the paper 
demonstrates how, from 1981 to 2011, Hollywood has improved its ability to 
predict the financial rankings of its films. More specifically, the Hollywood film 
business has become better at predicting which films will earn a greater-than-
average share of all US box-office gross revenues through a wide release strategy. 
This greater predictability suggests that confidence in film earnings projections has 
increased.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  These	  metaphors	  are	  taken	  from	  Mumford’s	  Technics	  and	  Civilization	  (Mumford	  2010).	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Risk and the Future Order of Cinema 
 
Capitalization is not a crystal ball in which the future is revealed to vested interests. 
As Nitzan and Bichler emphasize in their description of capitalization, capitalists 
are no better at predicting the future than anyone else—“like the rest of us, they 
can never see [the future]” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.187). 3  However, 
capitalization is, by design, concerned with the future of investment; it is a logic 
that is obsessed with estimating future earnings and whether they will or will not 
translate into actual earnings. By following the rituals of capitalization, the 
Hollywood film business is concerned with the future of mass culture. Firms in the 
film business capitalize cinema by discounting expected future earnings to the 
present according to their perception of the future dynamics of pleasure in society. 
 
Risk is a variable in the capitalization equation. It is an ex ante variable in the 
valuation of an asset and not an ex post explanation for why a capitalist ‘deserved’ 
a particular rate of return.4 Risk is a partly subjective factor that shapes the way a 
claim on future earnings is assessed. If capitalization discounts the size and pattern 
of a future stream of earnings, risk is the expression of the “degree of confidence 
capitalists have in their own predictions” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.208). Nitzan 
and Bichler argue that this degree of confidence appears in the capitalization 
equation as a risk coefficient (δ). A smaller δ indicates a greater the degree of 
confidence and a larger capitalization, and vice versa when δ is larger. If, for 
instance, there is growing uncertainty about the size and pattern of a future stream 
of earnings, δ will increase and the asset in question will be discounted to a lower 
present price. This outcome can be derived from the capitalization equation, which 
can be presented once more: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For a concise anthropology of capitalization, see (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, pp.147–166).	  4	  Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of risk is different from the neo-classical theory of risk. For 
their critique of the ‘risk premium’ and its role in the construction of the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), see (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, pp.198–210).	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How can we understand the role of risk in the capitalization of cinema? One of the 
ways is to think of how the world of cinema itself, as a composition of films, is an 
object of risk perceptions. The shape and order of cinema becomes significant for 
the rituals of capitalization because, in a sense, every film is in a cohort. For every 
year, a set of films is released and each film in the set acquires a financial ranking 
by virtue of being capitalized. To explain how this ranking relates to risk 
perceptions in the Hollywood film business, let me provide some background 
about the quantitative language of capital and its application in the art of 
filmmaking.  
 
The application of capitalization to the qualitative world of cinema implies that the 
qualities of films have become what Herbert Marcuse would call “quantifiable 
qualities” (Marcuse 1991, p.136). From the perspective of investment, the industrial 
art of filmmaking and the social world of mass culture are meant to be controlled in 
the interest of pecuniary gain. The Hollywood film business may or may not have 
successful strategies of creating an order of cinema through the control of 
filmmaking—that is yet to be determined—but it must translate the political, 
cultural and aesthetic qualities of cinema into the quantitative language of capital. 
Nitzan and Bichler’s argument about the eye of capitalization explains why a film’s 
many qualities—e.g., its genre, style, story, cast, director, production quality—and 
its possible resonance with established cultural and political attitudes would all be 
“integrated into the numerical architecture of capital”: the many dimensions of 
cinema could impact “the level and pattern of capitalist earnings” (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.166). 
 
A film project is translated into the language of capital in its germinal stages, well 
before the first day of filming.  Expectations about future earnings are being 
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discounted to present prices when scripts are sold while others are ignored, when 
some projects are properly developed while others sit idle, and when some projects 
are produced while others never make it out of “development hell.”5 As Janet 
Wasko points out in contrast to popular belief, “Hollywood films do not begin 
when the camera starts rolling, but involve a somewhat lengthy and complex 
development and pre-production phase during which an idea is turned into a script 
and preparations are made for actual production followed by post-production” 
(Wasko 2008, p.43). A project begins as a film concept, usually in the form of a full 
script in its first draft. If approved by management, the project then goes into 
development (which is far from the production stage), usually under the wing of a 
development executive (Wasko 2008, p.45). In development, the film concept is 
polished, the script is edited and re-edited, sometimes even rewritten completely, 
and producers and agents start talking about the film’s possible “players” (main cast 
and director). 
 
Throughout this process, the capitalization of cinema is concerned with how films 
will rank in the order of cinema. For one thing, the quantitative language of capital 
makes every film financially comparable. When a film is given an expected 
theatrical revenues plateau (e.g., $10 million, $50 million, $200 million), the 
Hollywood film business is making an estimate about the future popularity of the 
film (Litman 1998, p.44). And how a specific film is capitalized has something to 
do with its particular political, cultural and aesthetic qualities. Yet, this financial 
estimate automatically positions a film among other films. An estimate that a film 
will, for instance, earn $100 million in theatrical revenues is meaningful in relation 
to how other contemporary films are capitalized. An expectation of $100 million 
means one thing when, at a given time, $125 million in box-office revenues is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A project is in “development hell” when “a script is in development but never receives 
production funds” (Wasko 2008, p.53). In his “how-to” book about film financing, Michael 
Wiese estimates that major filmed entertainment produces one film for every fifty projects 
remain damned in purgatory (Wiese 1991, p.32).	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average expectation for most Hollywood films. It means something else when an 
estimation of $100 million puts the particular film ahead of the pack. Depending 
on how other films are capitalized, capitalists could expect that $100 million in 
box-office revenues would make this film one of the top grossing films of its year of 
release.  
 
Knowing how the expectations of one film relates to the expectations of all other 
films in the same time period is also significant when there is historical evidence 
that top ranking films have been able to differentially perform. Predicting that a film 
will be one of the top grossing films of the year matters when, since the late 1940s, 
the top one percent of films have increased their share of all box-office revenues 
per year. Mark Weinstein describes this phenomenon: “In the late 1940s, the top 1 
percent of films represented 2 percent to 3 percent of studio revenue; by the early 
1960s, this had tripled, to an average of about 6 percent. This trend has continued 
in recent years. In 1993 the world-wide revenues for the top 1 percent (two films) 
of 163 major-studio released films were 13.8 percent of the total [revenues]” 
(Weinstein 2005, p.252).  
 
Moreover, a confident prediction about how a film will rank in the order of cinema 
is also a strong recommendation about distribution strategy. It is common practice 
for the Hollywood film business to give wide theatrical releases to what it thinks 
will be ‘blockbusters’ or ‘must-see events.’ This strategy is also known as saturation 
booking, in which a film is simultaneously shown on many screens in many 
theatres (Maltby 2003, p.182). While it is a common one, this wide release strategy 
is relevant for our analysis of risk because it is not a universal strategy. Unlike 
“platform” releases, which open in a small number of theatres, usually in select 
cities (New York, Los Angeles, etc.), “wide” releases are designed to begin, from 
their very first week, in thousands of theatres across America. For example, Star 
Wars opened on nearly 3,000 theater screens in the United States (De Vany 2004, 
p.48). Furthermore, a wide release is meant to pull in the bulk of its revenues in the 
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first few weeks of its theatrical release—e.g., the 2001 film The Mummy Returns 
earned 90 percent of its total theatrical revenues in the first five weeks. Conversely, 
a platform release like O Brother, Where Art Thou? took four months to earn 90 
percent of its total theatrical revenues.6 
 
The History of Risk Perceptions in Hollywood 
 
The remainder of this paper traces the historical development of risk in Hollywood 
cinema. 7  My method involves using opening theatres as a proxy for future 
expectations. Opening theatres stands as a proxy for future expectations because 
the decision about the size of opening theatres is made before a stream of box-
office revenues actually begins to flow; decisions about what is a good release 
strategy for each film derive from financial expectations about what will happen to 
each film on its opening weekend and onwards. Furthermore, as I established 
above, the Hollywood film business is concerned with the future pecuniary rank of 
its films, which relates to the strategy of giving some films, but not all, wide 
theatrical releases. To be sure, in the end, not every high grossing film is the 
product of a wide release strategy. A platform release can, over time, become 
popular and consequently earn a relatively high level of gross revenues. For 
example, Schindler’s List opened in 25 theatres and was the ninth highest grossing 
film of 1993. Yet, behind the fact that some films are, from day one, released in 
1500, 2000 or even more theatres, is an assumption about expected revenues. In a 
sense, major filmed entertainment does not wait for its wide releases to eventually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  These two examples, The Mummy Returns and O Brother, Where Art Thou?, are taken 
from Maltby’s Hollywood Cinema (Maltby 2003, pp.200, 204). 7 The question of how Hollywood has reduced risk is left for a longer paper. A study of 
how risk is effectively reduced through particular techniques, such as the repetition of 
genres, sequels and remakes, the cult of movie stars, and the institution of false needs and 
wants, opens the door to a much larger argument about how one should research the 
political economy of Hollywood. Much of the academic literature on the risky character of 
the Hollywood film business, especially the mainstream literature, begins from theoretical 
presuppositions that are significantly different from the capital-as-power approach (De 
Vany 2004; Litman 1998; Nelson & Glotfelty 2012; Pokorny 2005).	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become popular. A wide release has, in comparison to a platform release, a shorter 
lifespan because its impact is supposed to be quick but big.  
 
Historical data on opening theatres enables us to approximate the evolution of 
Hollywood’s risk coefficient (δ), which denotes the confidence the Hollywood film 
business has in its predictions about the future financial performance of cinema. 
This approach demonstrates that from 1981 to 2011, Hollywood has been able to 
improve its ability to predict the financial performance of its films. This increased 
predictability reflects a better understanding of and perhaps a greater ability to 
shape popular culture. And this greater understanding and ability in turn translates 
into higher confidence, lower risk perception and higher capitalization. 
 
How can we use opening theatres to approximate the long-term trajectory of 
Hollywood’s risk perceptions? We can use as a means of comparing expected 
theatrical gross revenues to actual theatrical gross revenues. Take, for example, 
1986. To get a sense of Hollywood cinema in 1986, one can go to a website like 
boxofficemojo.com and reproduce Table 1, which is presented here in abridged 
format. This table ranks, in descending order, 1986 films in the first column by their 
domestic box-office gross revenues in the second. In addition, a third column 
shows the number of opening theatres for each film. Table 1 is interesting for a few 
reasons. What first stands out is Platoon, which opened in six theatres but 
eventually went on to become the third highest grossing film of 1986. This would 
be a good example of a highly successful platform release. The second and perhaps 
more important point is that there is no one-to-one match between revenue 
rankings and opening theatre rankings. For example, the two top grossing films—
Top Gun and Crocodile Dundee—did not have the two widest releases of that year. 
Already on this abridged list, we can see five films that had wider releases in 1986. 
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Film 
Box-Office Gross 
Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Top Gun $176,786,701 1,028 
Crocodile Dundee $174,803,506 879 
Platoon $138,530,565 6 
The Karate Kid Part II $115,103,979 1,323 
Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home $109,713,132 1,349 
Back to School $91,258,000 1,605 
Aliens $85,160,248 1,437 
The Golden Child $79,817,937 1,667 
… … … 
 
Table 1 Films Released in 1986: Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
 
 
Table 2 offers a different view of the same year. It sorts out all of the films released 
in 1986 not by box-office revenues, but by opening theatres. Aside from one film, 
Back to School, none of the films in Table 2 appear in Table 1. The films in Table 2 
had the widest releases in 1986 but only two of them were able to even reach the 
$50 million plateau. 
 
 
Film 
Box-Office Gross 
Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Cobra $49,042,224  2,131 
Police Academy 3: Back in Training $43,579,163  1,788 
Raw Deal $16,209,459  1,731 
The Delta Force $17,768,900  1,720 
The Golden Child $79,817,937  1,667 
Friday the 13th Part VI $19,472,057  1,610 
Back to School $91,258,000  1,605 
Poltergeist II: The Other Side $40,996,665  1,596 
… … … 
 
Table 2 Films Released in 1986: Ranked by Opening Theatres 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
 
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 compare the top performing films (ranked by gross 
revenues) to what Hollywood expected the top performing films to be (ranked by 
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opening theatres). Figure 1 extends this comparison over time. The figure contains 
three time series. Top 10%revenues measures, for each year, the US box-office gross 
revenues of the top ten percent of all films, ranked by box-office gross revenues 
(comparable to Table 1). The revenue data are presented as a percent share of all 
US box-office gross revenues for each year. The second series, Top 10%theatres, 
measures, for each year, the US box-office gross revenues of the top ten percent of 
all films, ranked by opening theatres (comparable to Table 2). This series is also 
presented as a percent share of all US box-office gross revenues. 
 
Similar to Weinstein’s observations, Top 10%revenues demonstrates how the top tier of 
films has, over a thirty-year period, increased its share of all US box-office gross 
revenues. The top ten percent of films in 1981 grabbed approximately 41 percent 
of all US box-office gross revenues for that year. In 2007 the top ten percent 
grabbed a 75 percent share of all US box-office revenues. 
 
What is more interesting for our purpose, however, is the relationship between Top 
10%revenues and Top 10%theatres. From the mid-1990s onwards, the fluctuations of the 
two series grow increasingly correlated.8 Additionally, over time the two series 
converge. This second observation is expressed with the third series of Figure 1, 
Top 10%predictability. Top 10%predictability presents, from 1981 to 2011, the ratio of Top 
10%revenues to Top 10%theatres. 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  correlation	  coefficient	  between	  Top	  10%revenues	  and	  Top	  10%theatres	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  five	  periods:	  1981-­‐1987	  (-­‐0.49),	  1988-­‐1993	  (+0.22),	  1994-­‐1999	  (+0.86),	  2000-­‐2005	  (+0.94)	  and	  2006-­‐2011	  (+0.89).	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Figure 1 US Gross Theatre Revenues: The Share of the Top 10% of All Films 
 
Note: Boxofficemojo.com provides, from 1981 to 2011, data for each film 
released in the United States. After grouping every film from 1981 to 2011 by 
their year of release, I sort each year twice: once to rank all films by their gross 
revenues, and another time by their opening theatres. Both times I measure the 
Top 10% share of the yearly total of US gross revenues. Each year, the measure 
of Top 10% is adjusted by the annual total of films released in the United States. 
 
Note: The series that is sorted by opening theatres is not simply measuring 
opening weekend revenues. It measures total theatrical gross of each relevant 
film. 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for number of films released per year, US 
theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres for each film, and the sum of all US 
theatrical gross revenues. 
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We can see that, over time, (1) the size of the ratio has decreased, getting closer 
and closer to 1, and (2) that the fluctuations in this ratio have lessened. What does 
it mean when Top 10%predictability is close to 1? Technically, it means that Top 
10%revenues and Top 10%theatres are counting more of the same films. In other words, 
in a year when Top 10%predictability is close to 1, the highest grossing films were also, 
more or less, given the widest releases. Conceptually, the declining ratio and 
fluctuations of Top 10%predictability suggest that Hollywood is getting better at 
predicting which movies will differentially perform. As the ratio approaches 1, the 
top 10% of the films put up for wide release end up also being the top 10% in 
terms of gross revenues, which is significant if the top tier of films are grabbing 
larger shares of all box-office revenues. 
 
For instance, in 2007, the value of the ratio was 1.089. Out of a possible 63 films, 
46 films are included in both Top 10%revenues and Top 10%theatres of that year. We can 
catch a glimpse of this fact by examining the top films of 2007 in Table 3. Table 3 
reproduces for 2007, in abbreviated form, the two perspectives of Tables 1 and 2. 
In 1986 only one film appeared in both Table 1 and Table 2—Back To School. As 
Table 3 demonstrates, five films appear in both rankings for 2007. Furthermore, the 
same five films of 2007 occupy, although in different order, both top five spots.  
 
Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues  Ranked by Opening Theatres 
Spider-Man 3  Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  
Shrek the Third  Harry Potter and the Order…  
Transformers  Spider-Man 3 
Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  Shrek the Third 
Harry Potter and the Order…  Transformers 
I Am Legend  Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer 
The Bourne Ultimatum  Ratatouille 
National Treasure: Book of Secrets  Bee Movie 
…  … 
 
 Table 3 Rankings in 2007 
 Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and 
 opening theatres. 
14 THE RISE OF A CONFIDENT HOLLYWOOD 	  
Future Research on the Hollywood Film Business 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates how, from 1981 to 2011, the Hollywood film business has 
been able to improve its predictions about what films will be in the top ten percent 
of each calendar year, ranked by box-office gross revenues. This improvement is a 
product of predicting, with greater confidence, which films will earn a greater share 
of all revenues through a wide release strategy. If the example of 2007 is any 
indication of risk perceptions about the contemporary order of Hollywood cinema, 
we can infer that major filmed entertainment has been able to predict the shape of 
this order with a greater degree of confidence.  
 
Figure 1 can be extended into future research on the capitalist nature of 
Hollywood. Its implications can be developed both empirically and theoretically. 
The next research task at hand is to refine this method of accounting for the future 
expectations of the Hollywood film business. For instance, the scope of Figure 1 is 
the top ten percent of each year. This scope can be widened or narrowed with 
future applications. Figure 2, for example, is the same as Figure 1, except that the 
former focuses on the top five percent of each year. Not only does Figure 2 
corroborate what Figure 1 implies, Top 5%predictability can be compared to Top 
10%predictability. This comparison is made in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2 US Gross Theatre Revenues: The Share of the Top 5% of All Films 
 
Note: Boxofficemojo.com provides, from 1981 to 2011, data for each film 
released in the United States. After grouping every film from 1981 to 2011 by 
their year of release, I sort each year twice: once to rank all films by their gross 
revenues, and another time by their opening theatres. Both times I measure the 
Top 5% share of the yearly total of US gross revenues. Each year, the measure of 
Top 5% is adjusted by the annual total of films released in the United States. 
 
Note: The series that is sorted by opening theatres is not simply measuring 
opening weekend revenues. It measures total theatrical gross of each relevant 
film. 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for number of films released per year, US 
theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres for each film, and the sum of all US 
theatrical gross revenues. 
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Figure 3 Two Measures of Declining Risk 
 
Note: See Figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
This paper can also be the stepping-stone to a larger investigation of the power 
underpinnings of Hollywood’s risk perceptions. The rise of a confident Hollywood 
suggests that its firms have found more effective means of developing, green-
lighting and producing the “right” set of films. Using the capital-as-power 
framework, we can ask bigger questions about the ways in which the art of 
filmmaking is made to dance to the tune of business enterprise. The capitalization 
of cinema, like that of every other creative activity, requires that the industrial art of 
filmmaking be strategically sabotaged. For the Hollywood film business to invest 
in—and therefore enable the creation of—some films but not all possible types of 
film, is to strategically sabotage aspects of social creativity and imagination. Future 
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research on strategic sabotage could go a long way in helping us understand how 
cinema, under the eye of capitalization, is an order of quantifiable qualities, where 
the hope is that its films develop predictable financial trajectories, just like the 
paths of comets in the sky.  
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